Noncooperative network routing games are a natural model of users trying to selfishly route flow through a network in order to minimize their own delays. It is well known that the solution resulting from this selfish routing (called the Nash equilibrium) can have social cost strictly higher than the cost of the optimum solution. One way to improve the quality of the resulting solution is to centrally control a fraction of the flow. A natural problem for the network administrator then is to route the centrally controlled flow in such a way that the overall cost of the solution is minimized after the remaining fraction has routed itself selfishly.
Introduction and related work
Noncooperative network routing games are a nice model of the behavior of selfish users trying to optimize their own benefit. In such a game, each player intends to send a fixed amount of flow from its source to its sink using a shortest delay path through the given network in a noncooperative manner.
The solution reached by players selfishly routing their flow is called the Nash equilibrium or Nash flow. Since players choose their paths to minimize their own delay alone, the quality of the resulting Nash equilibrium in general may be worse than the quality of the optimum way to route flow through the network so as to minimize the total overall latency of all users, which may be thought of as the social cost of the routing. A classic example of Pigou [13] shows that this can indeed be the case. The ratio of the cost of the Nash equilibrium to the optimum solution is called the Price of Anarchy [9] . The idea of bounding the price of anarchy in network routing games has become well-studied after the groundbreaking work of Roughgarden and Tardos [19] . Roughgarden and Tardos show that for general latency functions, the price of anarchy can be arbitrarily large. For the class of networks with linear latency functions, however, they prove that the price of anarchy is bounded by 4/3.
The Nash equilibrium is an attractive concept from the point of view of the study of stable equilibria since no player has any incentive to unilaterally change his/her strategy. But its inefficiency (that is, its potentially large cost compared to the social optimum) has always been a concern. There has been substantial work on ways to address this issue. Some such methods are: (i) Mechanism design, in which the rules of the game are established to help ensure that the quality of the resulting Nash compatible with the rules is good compared to the social optimum, (see, for example, [12, 11] ), (ii) Taxes and tolls on network links to discourage users from using some links which lead to inefficient equilibria, (see, for example, [1, 2, 5, 4] ), (iii) Designing the network in such a way that the network has good Nash to optimum ratio to start with (see, for example, [14, 8] ), and (iv) Capacity augmentation, such that the cost of Nash equilibrium in augmented network is good compared to the cost of optimum in the original network (see, for example, [19] ). Also see Roughgarden's survey [18] for a discussion about coping with inefficiency of Nash equilibria. All these methods necessitate either a change in the way game is played in the existing network or a change in the network itself.
Another way to improve the quality of the Nash equilibrium is to consider situations in which not all flow is routed selfishly. The motivation comes from considering networks where there is a mix of selfish and centrally controlled players. An example of such a network mentioned in Roughgarden's thesis [15, Chapter 6] is that of a network where there may be two different prices. Clients paying the premium price get to choose their own route through the network and those paying the bargain price do not get a choice of routesthey are controlled centrally by the network administrator. Roughgarden [16] considers the problem of routing a β fraction of flow centrally in such a way that if the remaining 1 − β fraction chooses their own paths selfishly then the cost of the resulting solution is minimized. He calls the routing of the centrally controlled flow a Stackelberg strategy and the resulting equilibrium the equilibrium induced by the strategy with fraction β; we will refer to the latter as simply the Stackelberg equilibrium. He addresses the question of finding a Stackelberg strategy such that the cost of the resulting Stackelberg equilibrium is close to the social optimum. For a network of parallel links and centrally controlled 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 fraction of flow, he gives a Stackelberg strategy such that the resulting Stackelberg equilibrium comes within a 1/β factor of the social optimum for arbitrary latencies and within a 4/(3 + β) factor for linear latencies.
To be more specific about the problem considered by Roughgarden, we let G be a network with two nodes {s, t}, a source s and a sink t, and k directed parallel links {e1, e2, . . . , e k } from s to t. Each edge ei is equipped with a latency function li(x) : R ≥0 → R ≥0 which is nonnegative, continuous, and nondecreasing. A total flow of amount r is to be routed from s to t such that the total latency experienced by the whole flow is minimized. In other words, the socially optimum flow f = (f1, f2, . . . , f k ) is such that
. . , k. Then the Stackelberg equilibrium induced byh is a Nash equilibrium routing (1 − β)r flow in the graph G with latenciesl.
For 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, let c(G, r, l, β,h) be the cost of the Stackelberg equilibrium induced byh, and let c(G, r, l, β) = minh c(G, r, l, β,h) be the cost of the optimum Stackelberg equilibrium with centrally controlled flow fraction β. Then c(G, r, l, 1) is the social optimum cost, and c(G, r, l, 0) is the social cost of the Nash flow. Note that finding c(G, r, l, β) for an arbitrary network and an arbitrary β is weakly NPcomplete as proved in [15, Chapter 6] . Roughgarden [16] has shown that c(G, r, l, β) ≤ c(G, r, l, 1). There has been a fair amount of followup work on finding good Stackelberg strategies. For parallel links networks equipped with latency functions represented as polynomials with non-negative coefficients, Kumar and Marathe [10] give a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a Stackelberg strategyh such that c(G, r, l, β,h) ≤ (1 + ε)c(G, r, l, β) for any given ε > 0. Swamy [20] extends the results for Roughgarden's Largest Latency First strategy [16] to incorporate various topologies and arbitrary latency functions. For seriesparallel graphs (with arbitrary latency functions), he bounds the price of anarchy by 1 + 1/β and for the parallel links graphs (with latency functions from a class L), by β
is the price of anarchy for networks with latency functions from class L. For general graphs, he obtains latency class specific bounds on the price of anarchy which give a continuous tradeoff between the fraction of flow controlled and the price of anarchy. Correa and Stier-Moses independently obtained the bound of 1 + 1 β for the series-parallel graphs [3] . For general topology networks equipped with linear delay functions, and multicommodity users, Karakostas and Kolliopoulos [7] show that the cost of a particular Stackelberg equilibrium (corresponding to the SCALE strategy as suggested in [16] ) with β fraction of centrally controlled flow is at most (4 − X)/3 times the cost of the optimum solution where X =
. In this paper, we study a simple but interesting question regarding Stackelberg equilibria in this setting: what fraction β of flow needs to be centrally controlled for there to be any improvement in the social cost whatsoever? We call this amount the Stackelberg threshold and denote it by σ(G, r, l).
To be more precise, σ(G, r, l) is the minimum value of β such that c(G, r, l, β + ε) < c(G, r, l, 0) for any ε > 0. In the network setting of Roughgarden, the Stackelberg threshold is the minimum fraction of bargain price users that the network administrator must get in order for the overall routing cost to be less than the cost of the Nash equilibrium in which everyone is able to route their own flows selfishly.
At first glance, it might appear that the threshold is trivially 0: that is, c(G, r, l, ε) < c(G, r, l, 0) for any network G of parallel links. However, if the latency functions are such that c(G, r, l, 0) = c(G, r, l, 1)-that is, the Nash equilibrium happens to have optimum social cost-this is clearly false.
As this example points out, the threshold depends on the price of anarchy of the instance. This is also implied by Roughgarden's result. For linear latency functions, Roughgarden and Tardos [19] Kaporis and Spirakis [6] study a closely related problem of determining the minimum fraction βM of flow in a graph such that controlling that fraction through some Stackelberg strategy gives rise to a Stackelberg equilibrium of cost equal to the cost of the optimum solution; that is, they find the minimum βM such that c(G, r, l, βM ) = c(G, r, l, 1). They call this the Price of Optimum and give an algorithm to compute the price of optimum for single commodity networks equipped with continuous, differentiable, and strictly increasing latency functions. Using some insights from the proof of our main result, we are able to give a short proof of this result as well for the case of parallel links networks.
Before turning to the proof of our results, we conclude with a brief reflection on our motivation for considering Stackelberg thresholds. Stackelberg network routing games are usually discussed in the context of the central control of flow. This creates images of technocrats coercing routings for the benefit of society, either directly by controlling users or indirectly via taxes. An alternate image (though equivalent mathematically) is that of small coalitions of users behaving altruistically; that is, deciding not to behave selfishly, but in ways that improve the overall social welfare. Our reason for studying Stackelberg thresholds is to ask: how big do such coalitions have to be in order to make a difference? Part of the answer given by Roughgarden's work is: it depends on how bad things are. When things are at their worst, even infinitesimally small coalitions make a difference. Studies of the price of anarchy ask how bad off we are if everyone behaves selfishly; part of our motivation is to flip the question and ask how much better off we can be if some small fraction of users do not. Hence we ask not what is the price of anarchy, but what is the value of altruism? How much of it is required to be useful? This perspective suggests an interesting research agenda to which this paper is a modest contribution.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin in Section 2 with some introductory notation, definitions, and lemmas. Then in Section 3 we state the lemmas we will need to prove, and show how they imply our main theorem. Section 5 gives a way to transform a Nash equilibrium into a Stackelberg equilibrium, which is used to prove the main theorem. Sections 6 and 7 prove main technical lemmas. Our proof of correctness of the Kaporis-Spirakis algorithm to compute the Price of Optimum is in Section 8.
Some introductory definitions and lemmas
Let G be a graph with two nodes, a source s and a sink t, and with k parallel links from s to t. We require r units of flow to be sent from s to t. Let the latency on link i be li(xi) = aixi + bi with ai, bi ≥ 0; we will sometimes refer to this as the delay of the link. We assume without loss of generality that there is exactly one link whose latency function is constant. If there are more than one such links, then we can remove all but the one with the minimum latency. If there is none, we can add one with a large enough latency, say max i∈ [k] li(r), without affecting anything.
Let f be a Nash flow sending flow fi on link i and g be an optimum flow sending flow gi on link i. By feasibility of flows,
The goal is to determine for this specific network G the minimum value of β ∈ [0, 1] such that c(G, r, l, β + ε) < c(G, r, l, 0) for any ε > 0, or equivalently the minimum value of β such that getting central control of infinitesimally more fraction of flow than β allows a Stackelberg equilibrium of cost strictly less than the cost of the Nash equilibrium.
Throughout this paper, we will leth denote a Stackelberg strategy and h denote an induced Stackelberg equilibrium. It is worth noting that the flow h does not includeh in it; that is P j hj = r − P jh j (and not equal to r). We call the flow controlled by a Stackelberg strategy centrally controlled flow or altruistic flow, and the equilibrium flow h the selfish flow.
Before stating (and proving) our main theorem in the next section, we recall the following well-known lemmas and definitions specialized to the case of parallel links. Most of the omitted proofs can be found in [17] . 
By Lemma 1, each link j with fj > 0 must have the same latency in f ; we denote this common latency by L. Similarly, the common marginal latency of links with gj > 0 in the optimum solution is denoted by L * and the common latency of all links with hj > 0 in a Stackelberg equilibrium is denoted by L h . For the Nash flow f , marginal latencies l * j (fj ) may not all be same. We use ε * j to denote their deviation from L * ; that is for all j, we let ε * j be such that
. The latency (marginal latency) of any link carrying positive flow in Nash equilibrium (optimum flow) cannot be larger than the latency (marginal latency) of the constant link. That is, fj > 0 implies
We review some results about the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium.
Lemma 5. If f and f are flows at Nash equilibrium for the instance (G, r, l), then (i) the cost of f is equal to the cost of f , (ii) for all
where L f and L f denote the common latencies experienced by selfish flow in f and f respectively.
Lemma 6. Let h and h be two Stackelberg equilibria induced by Stackelberg strategyh. Then the costs of these two equilibria are equal.
We partition all links into two sets, the set of good links, and the set of bad links. We define them next. 
The proof of the main theorem
We present in this section our main theorem and some lemmas which will be helpful in the proof of the theorem. Recall that a good link is the one with more optimum flow than the Nash flow (fj < gj) and a bad link is the one with at least as much Nash flow as the optimum flow (fj ≥ gj). At a high level, we show that a Stackelberg strategy routing more than the Nash flow on a good link gives rise to a Stackelberg equilibrium of improved social cost, while a Stackelberg strategy routing more than the Nash flow on bad links gives rise to Stackelberg equilibria with worse social cost (subject to some caveats). We let f * denote the minimum of Nash flows on good links, and i * the corresponding link. Formally,
If there are many indices for which the flow is equal to f * , define i * to be an arbitrary such link, say the lowest indexed one. We have f * = fi * . Our main theorem in essence states that the Stackelberg threshold for the network G is f * /r. We need some notation to introduce our main theorem. 
The set of all other links is [k] − S(h) − U (h)
. We now state two lemmas which are central to the proof of our main theorem. Their proofs appear in subsequent sections. The first one provides the upper bound of f * /r on the Stackelberg threshold, and the second one provides a lower bound of f * /r on the Stackelberg threshold.
Then there exists a Stackelberg strategyh with β(h) = β and c(G, r, l, β,h) < c(G, r, l, 0) (which implies that c(G, r, l, β) < c(G, r, l, 0)). In other words, for the amount of centrally controlled flow strictly more than f * , there exists a Stackelberg strategy controlling that amount of flow and having cost strictly less than the cost of the Nash equilibrium.
We comment on the Stackelberg strategy (and equilibrium) alluded to above. If the altruistic flow amount is more than f * , then the Stackelberg strategy referred to above routes f * + ε flow on link i * for a small enough ε and remaining flow appropriately on links other than i. For this Stackelberg strategy, S(h) = {i * } andhi * = f * + ε for small ε. The condition β ≤ f * r implies that S(h) does not contain any good link (otherwise, the amount of altruistic flow will be more than f * ). The above lemma in essence states that if the Stackelberg strategy does not have enough flow to influence flow on a good link, then it cannot induce a Stackelberg equilibrium of cost less than the cost of the Nash equilibrium.
We are now ready to state and prove our main theorem. Proof. If there is a link with zero Nash flow and positive optimum flow, then f * = 0. Lemma 9 states that controlling ε > 0 amount of flow gives rise to a Stackelberg equilibrium of cost less than the cost of the Nash equilibrium. It should also be clear that a Stackelberg strategy controlling zero amount of flow cannot have Stackelberg equilibrium of cost less than the cost of the Nash equilibrium. So, σ(G, r, l) = 0 = f * /r in this case.
We can now assume that there is no link with zero Nash flow and positive optimum flow. Lemma 9 states that σ(G, r, l) ≤ f * /r since it gives a Stackelberg strategy controlling f * + ε flow which gives rise to a Stackelberg equilibrium with strictly smaller cost than the cost of the Nash equilibrium. Lemma 10 states that σ(G, r, l) ≥ f * /r since any Stackelberg strategy controlling at most f * flow cannot improve the cost to better than the cost of the Nash equilibrium. It follows that σ(G, r, l) = f * /r.
We comment here on the definition of f * . The quantity f * is defined with respect to a Nash equilibrium and an optimum solution (which may not be unique). But the condition c (G, r, l, 0) > c(G, r, l, 1) together with Lemma 14 below guarantees that the Nash equilibrium is unique, as is the optimum solution, so this quantity is well defined.
We next give some intuition behind the proofs.
An informal explanation of the proof
We represent the network as a collection of links, and each link by a curve (corresponding to its latency) on two dimensional coordinate axes, where the x-axis corresponds to the amount of flow and the y-axis corresponds to the latency experienced.
If we look at the network in terms of Figure 1 , controlling flow on link i has a natural interpretation. Say, the Stackelberg strategy pushes more than f1 flow on link 1, this gives rise to a latency of more than L on link 1, and the flow on other links decreases so that all latencies on those links remain the same (the latency level comes down). We can think of latencies as the water-level which remains equal on all uncontrolled links. In terms of the water-level, the optimum solution has a water-level for marginal latency (in the same way as the Nash equilibrium has water-level for latency), called L * in Figure 1 . The marginal latencies of links in Nash equilibrium in general are not the same as L * , they have a deviation from L * ; link 1 has a deviation of (l * 1 (f1) − L * ), link 2 has a deviation of (l * 2 (f2) − L * ), and so on. The intuition is that if a strategy tries to decrease the absolute value of this deviation, then the quality of resulting solution is better than the quality of the Nash equilibrium, if it tries to increase the absolute value of the deviations, then the quality is worse.
The proof of Lemma 9 basically requires us to prove that if we push more flow than the Nash flow on a good link such as link 2 (see Figure 1 , link 2 is a good link) decreasing the absolute value of its deviation from L * , then the overall cost of the solution decreases, the decrease coming from the decrease of flow on all links other than 2.
The proof of the second key lemma, Lemma 10, requires us to prove (modulo some caveats) that if we do not have enough flow to influence flow on a good link, then the quality of the Stackelberg equilibrium cannot be better than the Nash equilibrium. A strategy that controls less flow than the Nash flow on a good link can control flow on various bad links in whatever way it wishes: say it controls flow on links 1 and 3 in Figure 1 , or it can increase flow on link 1 (a bad link) beyond f1 resulting in its marginal latency being even farther from L * than l * 1 (f1) originally was (increasing its deviation from L * ). It can also control flow on a good link as long as it does not control more than the Nash flow on that good link; for example, the strategy can possibly control less than f2 flow on link 2 (in Figure 1) . Any of these strategies cannot improve the quality of the Nash equilibrium.
To prove the second key lemma, we start from a Stackelberg strategy that induces the Nash equilibrium as its Stackelberg equilibrium, and gradually modify it to the given strategy. We show that as long as we do not have enough flow to influence flow on a good link, the rate of change in the social cost throughout the above said modification is nonnegative. Then Lemma 6 guarantees that the cost of the equilibrium induced by the given strategy must be no better than that of the Nash.
The proofs of Lemmas 9 and 10 are mainly built on the intuition above. We proceed to state some lemmas which will be helpful in the proof of two key lemmas.
Some useful lemmas
In this section, we state some lemmas which we need for the proofs of Lemma 9 and 10. Most of the proofs are omitted due to lack of space.
Lemma 12. If c(G, r, l, 0) > c(G, r, l, 1), then (i) the latency of the constant link is positive, (ii) L > 0.

Observation 13. Suppose a Nash equilibrium f has common latency L and an optimum solution
g has common marginal latency L * . Then L ≤ L * .
Lemma 14. (Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and optimum solution). If c(G, r, l, 0) > c(G, r, l, 1), then there is a unique Nash equilibrium, and a unique optimum solution.
The following lemma relates the amount of Nash flow on the constant link to amount of optimum flow on it.
Lemma 15. 
Proof. Let P = {j : j = z, fj > 0, gj > 0} and N = {j : j = z, fj = 0, gj > 0}. We have gz . Using these expressions for all j, we get
since both sides are equal to r. Rearranging the terms and subtracting P j:j =z,f j >0 fj from both sides gives the result. We have changed the index set in the first summation on the left hand side from {j : j = z, fj > 0, gj > 0} to {j : j = z, fj > 0} above because {j : j = z, fj > 0, gj > 0} = {j : j = z, fj > 0}. The ⊆ direction is easy. For the ⊇ direction, notice that for
The following lemma relates the amounts of flow on links of a network in two different Nash equilibria routing different amounts of total flow. Lemma 17. Let f r be a Nash flow with common latency L r for the network (G, r, l) and let q < r. Then there exists a Nash flow f q with common latency L q for the network (G, q, l) with the property that f
Relating Stackelberg equilibrium to Nash equilibrium
In this section, we describe a continuous time process, called the Stackelberg process P , which does the following. Given an instance (G, r, l) and a Stackelberg strategyh con-
)/r fraction of flow, it starts at time t = 0 with a Nash equilibrium f of the instance (G, r, l) and ends at time t = 1 with an induced Stackelberg equilibrium for the instance (G, r, l, β) with Stackelberg strategyh. We use the notation fA = P i∈A fi.
The Stackelberg process
The process P is a continuous time process that transforms a Nash equilibrium f into a particular induced Stackelberg equilibrium for strategyh. The time varies from t = 0 We start with a Nash equilibrium f for the network (G, r, l) (choose an arbitrary one if there are many choices). Recall the definitions of S(h) and U (h) from Definition 8; S(h) = {j :hj > fj } and U (h) = {j : 0 <hj ≤ fj }. Whenh is clear from the context, we will call them S and U respectively for brevity. We first give the description of P 0 , the state of the process in the beginning.h 0 is defined as:h
, which is easily seen to be a Stackelberg equilibrium forh 0 . At time t ∈ (0, 1], the state P t of the process P has the following specification.h t is described as
which gives rise to β(h t ) = P k j=1h t j /r. It is clear that for an edge j in S(h), P monotonically increases flow on it at a constant rate of (hj − fj ), while for an edge j in U (h), it keeps the flow constant on j, maintaining at the constant amounthj > 0. We have that
Given h s for all s < t, we will now see how to find h t (if h t is not unique, we will find a particular one which will suffice for our purpose). It is clear that h s is a Nash equilibrium in the network (G, r − P
) and h t is a Nash equilibrium in the network (G, r − P We wish to remark that the exact rule for how we increase flow on links in S and U from time 0 to time 1 is immaterial. Another rule for increasing the altruistic flow will be equally valid as long as it increases flow on links in S monotonically (strictly increasing fashion), it gives rise to a Nash equilibrium at time t = 0 and a Stackelberg equilibrium corresponding toh at time t = 1. The rule that we give is easy to describe, and we work with it in the rest of the paper.
To recap the process P , it starts at time t = 0 controlling fS +hU amount of flow (this is strategyh 0 ), giving rise to a particular Stackelberg equilibrium h 0 = f −h0. The process continuously increases the altruistic flow on links in S linearly with time, and the (selfish) flow on all other links responds. For links outside the set S, if there is a positive selfish flow on a link, it decreases by a small amount to respond to the deficit of selfish flow on links outside of S, else the only altruistic flow on the link remains at the same level. This process continues until it makes altruistic flow amount equal to the amount in the Stackelberg strategy, that ishS +hU at time t = 1.
We claim that this process gives rise to a valid Stackelberg equilibrium for strategyh at time 1. It is easy to see that all selfish flow is on shortest latency paths (we have chosen the Stackelberg equilibrium guaranteed by Lemma 17) and the amount of altruistic flow is also respected, so h def = h 1 is a valid Stackelberg equilibrium. There might be other equilibria induced by strategyh than the one the process finds, but from Lemma 6 the cost of all equilibria is the same.
We denote by Z t the set of links which have zero h t -flow at time t. Z 0 is of course {j : j ∈ S(h)} ∪ {j : fj =hj } = {j : fj <hj} ∪ {j : fj =hj }. In particular, S(h) ⊆ Z 0 . As the time increases from t = 0 to t = 1, the selfish flow on links in [k] − Z 0 decreases, and the link j is added to Z t (and to all Z t for all t ≥ t) at the smallest time instance t such that h 
Proof of Lemma 9
Proof of Lemma 9: We first consider the case when β = f * +ε r for infinitesimally small ε > 0. We will extend the same idea to larger values of β at the end of the proof.
We will prove a slightly more general following claim: for any good link i, the Stackelberg strategy of routing fi+ε flow on link i induces a Stackelberg strategy of strictly smaller cost than the cost of the Nash equilibrium. Taking this link to be the link i * will prove the lemma.
Let i be a good link (a link with fi < gi). We consider the Stackelberg strategyh withhi = fi + ε for small ε > 0 and hj = 0 for j = i. Clearly, S(h) = {i} and U (h) = ∅. The idea is to first determine the rate of increase of the social cost as the Stackelberg strategy increases flow on link i (we call it the rate of increase for brevity), then to determine the rate of decrease of the social cost because of the decrease of flow on links other than i (we call it the rate of decrease), and then show that the rate of decrease is strictly more than the rate of increase.
We consider the Stackelberg process described in Section 5. In the process, the selfish flow does not increase on any link in [k] − {i} when we increase the altruistic flow on link i. Indeed, the amount of selfish flow decreases on links {j : j = i, fj > 0} as we increase the amount of altruistic flow on link i. Note that the set [k] − Z 0 as defined in the description of the process P in Section 5 is equal to {j : j = i, fj > 0}.
The rate of increase of the social cost with increase of flow on link i is l * i (fi) = 2aifi + bi = L * + ε * i . On the other hand, the rate of decrease of social cost with decrease of flow on links in [k] − Z 0 depends on whether z ∈ [k] − Z 0 . We consider these cases separately.
, then the constant link carries a non-zero amount of flow and the decrease of flow occurs only on the constant link. This gives rise to the rate of decrease of social cost equal to l *
Case 2: z ∈ Z 0 . Alternatively, if z ∈ Z 0 , then the flow decreases on non-constant links. The decrease of flow on links is such that the decreases in latency on all of them is equal, say l. Since the decrease in latency (on link j = i with fj > 0) is l, the decrease in amount of flow is l/aj . Therefore the total decrease in the social cost is P
(2aj fj + bj) since the rate of decrease of social cost on link j is l * j (fj ) = 2aj fj + bj. Moreover, the total decrease in flow on links {j : fj > 0, j = i} is equal to the total increase of flow on link i, that is ε. Therefore, P
The rate of decrease of the social cost is total decrease in the social cost divided by ε, which is (by using the fact 2aj fj
We now prove that the rate of increase is strictly less than the rate of decrease of the social cost.
In this case, we need to prove that
After some manipulation, we are left to prove
. If i = z (other case will be considered later), then it reduces to proving (using Lemma 16)
In this case the left hand side is 0. This follows from the fact that i = z is a good link, fz < gz, and L ≤ bz = L * which implies ε * i = ε * z = 0. The right hand side is strictly positive since fz < gz. The inequality hence follows in this case. On the other hand, if i = z, then we are left to prove (again using Lemma 16)
In this case, we have fi < gi. We also have 2aifi + bi = L * + ε * i and 2aigi + bi = L * . This gives ε * i = 2ai(fi − gi) < 0. The left hand side is therefore strictly negative. On the right hand side, the first term in nonnegative from Lemma 15, the second term is positive, and the last term is again nonnegative. Therefore, the right hand side is strictly positive, proving that the inequality holds in this case too. This finishes the proof the the lemma for the case when β = f * +ε r for sufficiently small ε > 0. Let β ∈ (f * /r, 1] now. We find a small enough ε0 > 0 (with f * + ε0 ≤ βr) from the previous part such that we can find a Stackelberg strategyh that induces a Stackelberg equilibrium h with cost strictly less than the cost of the Nash equilibrium. To get a strategy for βr altruistic flow, the intuition is the following. We route f * + ε0 amount of flow on edge i * and pretend that the rest of the flow is selfish and let it route on minimum latency paths. At the end, we declare some of the selfish flow (exactly βr − (f * + ε0) amount) altruistic and output the corresponding strategy for βr flow. The old induced Stackelberg equilibrium h is still a Stackelberg equilibrium if we remove from h the flow that we declared altruistic in the end. This intuition can be turned into a proof in a straightforward manner, which is omitted due to lack of space. The lemma then follows.
Proof of Lemma 10
We want to prove that if the amount of flow controlled by a Stackelberg strategy is at most f * , then the resulting Stackelberg equilibrium cannot be cheaper than the Nash solution. Let us fix a Stackelberg strategyh such that the total flow controlled centrally byh is at most f * . We then derive from this assumption (and the assumption that {j : fj = 0, gj > 0} = ∅ which is part of Lemma 10) that the cost of the resulting Stackelberg equilibrium h has cost at least as much as the cost of the Nash equilibrium, that is c (G, r, l, β,h) ≥ c(G, r, l, 0) . Recall the definitions of S(h) and U (h) from Definition 8; S(h) = {j :hj > fj } and U (h) = {j : 0 <hj ≤ fj }. Whenh is clear from the context, we call them S and U respectively. Let S = {s1, s2, . . . , s |S| } and U = {u1, u2, . . . , u |U | } for this particularh.
The plan for proving Lemma 10
We wish to show that the cost ofh + h is at least as much as the cost of the Nash equilibrium. We will use the Stackelberg process defined in Section 5 in the following way. At time t = 0, the cost of the Nash equilibrium is equal to the cost of the Stackelberg equilibrium (h 0 + h 0 ). For any arbitrary time instance t ∈ [0, 1), when the process increases an infinitesimal amount of flow on links in S, the flow on other links decreases. There is an increment in the social cost because of increase of flow on links in S and there is some decrease in social cost because of decrease of flow on links not in S (on links in [k]−Z t to be precise). We determine the rate of increase of social cost with increase of flow on links in S and also determine the rate of decrease of social cost with decrease of flow on links in [k] − Z t . We compare this rate of increase with the rate of decrease and prove that the rate of increase is no less than the rate of decrease for all t ∈ [0, 1).
The rate of increase of the social cost
At time t ∈ [0, 1), if the increase in the (centrally controlled) flow amount on links in S is ε > 0, let it be divided among links in S in the ratio σ1 : σ2 : · · · : σ |S| with σ1 + · · · + σ |S| = 1. (According to the rules described in the description of the process, σj = (hj − fj )/( P j∈S (hj − fj )) for j ∈ S.) On link si ∈ S, the rate of increase of social cost with increase in flow on this link is l * 
Here we have used the fact thath 0 s = fs for s ∈ S. The inequality above follows sinceh t j ≥h 0 j for j ∈ S and t ≥ 0.
The rate of decrease of the social cost
With increase of altruistic flow on links in S, the selfish flow on other links responds by decreasing on links in [k]−Z optimum solution. This follows since if (h + h)j > gj on any link, it must be the case that (h + h)j < gj on some other link, and hence the algorithm would not have terminated. Thus controlling γr flow indeed can give rise to an optimum solution, proving γ ≥ βM .
For the other direction, order the links in the order that the flowh on them becomes positive (i.e., the algorithm OpTop controls positive flow on that link). The links controlled in the first iteration are ordered first (in arbitrary order), then the links controlled in the second iteration and so on. Uncontrolled links are placed at the end of the arrangement. Note that for all j,hj ∈ {gj , 0}. We prove γ ≤ βM by a contradiction; for the sake of contradiction, assume that there is a Stackelberg strategyh * controlling strictly less than γ fraction of the flow that induces a Stackelberg equilibrium of optimal cost. Then there must be a link, say j0, such thathj 0 >h
